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Williams: Public Lands- Forests and Forestry - Is Clearcutting Prohibited

CASE NOTES
PUBLIC LANDS - Forests and Forestry - Is clearcutting prohibited by the
Organic Act of 1897? Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 6 ERC 1016
(N.D. W.Va. 1973)

The Izaak Walton League and other conservation organizations 1 alleged that the National Forest Organic Act of
18972 permits only the cutting of dead, mature or large
growth trees which are individually marked and all of which
must be removed from the forest.' They therefore sought a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief requiring the
United States Forest Service to comply with the provisions
of this act in three specific sales4 and all future sales in the
Monongahela National Forest. The defendant Department
of Agriculture officials' answered that reading the statutory
provisions cited by plaintiffs in the context of the purposes
embodied in that act' indicated that the language was meant
to be applied collectively to trees within the forest and not to
individual trees. Held, the clear and unmistakable language
of the Organic Act authorizes only the sale of individually
marked and regionally designated dead or mature trees, all
of which must be removed from the forest.
Copyright@ 1974 by the University of Wyoming

1. The Sierra Club, the National Resources Defense Council, Inc., the West
Virginia Highlands Conservancy, and Forest Armentrout joined the West
Virginia Division of the Izaak Walton League in bringing this action.
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 478-482, 551 (1970).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970):
For the purpose of preserving the living and growing timber
and promoting the younger growth on national forests, the Secretary of Agriculture, under such rules and regulations as he shall
prescribe, may cause to be designated and appraised so much of
the dead, matured, or large growth of trees found upon such national forests as may be compatible with the utilization of the forests thereon,... to be used in the State or Territory in which such
timber reservation may be situated, respectively, but not for export
therefrom .

. .

. Such timber, before being sold, shall be marked

and designated, and shall be cut and removed under the supervision

4. The specific sales were called the Middle Mountain North Sale, the Snorting Lick Sale, and the Music Run Sale. The harvesting was to total some
1,077 acres of which 428 acres were to be clearcut. Even in the areas not
clearcut, trees as small as 5 inches in diameter at breast height were to
be cut.
5. Defendants in this action were Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, Chief
of the Forest Service John R. McGuire, Regional Forester Jay H. Cravens,
and Forest Supervisor Alfred H. Troutt.
6. Defendants emphasized that portion of 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970) providing
that one of the purposes of the act is to furnish a continuous supply of
timber to the people of the United States. They argued, basically, that the
act requires scientific management and that determination of the specific
management practices to be followed is within the discretion of the Secretary
of Agriculture.
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This case is significant because it is the first case construing the language of the Organic Act to prohibit what is commonly referred to as clearcutting. Clearcutting has expanded
since its acceptance as official policy in 1964' to the point
where it accounts for almost half of the timber harvest of
the national forests.' This note will consider the legal reason-

ing of the court's opinion, examine other cases construing this
portion of the act, and reflect on the policy considerations
inherent in the case. The conclusion ultimately reached is
that the decision may be correct as a social determination on

the basis of the facts before the court, but the decision is
probably incorrect in its statutory construction.
THE REASONING

"The words.., of a statute are to be accorded their plain
and ordinary meaning."9 With this documented" basic assumption, the court proceedel to examine the statutory language on which the plaintiffs had focused this action. 1 The
language provides explicitly that the Secretary of Agriculture
may sell dead, mature, or large growth timber. 2 Since the
7. Izaak Walton League v. Butz, 6 E.R.C. 1016, 1019 (N.D. W.Va. 1973).
See also Senator Randolph, A Senator Looks at Forestry, 77 AM. FORESTS
14, 15 (Jan. 1971) (hereinafter cited as Senator Randolph).
8. See N. WOOD, CLEARCUT, THE DEFORESTATION OF AMERICA 7 (1971) (hereinafter cited as WOOD).
9. Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1023.
10. The court cited Justice Frankfurter in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944), which indicated that statutes not in technical terms are meant to be understood by the ordinary man. Judge Maxwell's approach was to examine the statute to the exclusion of virtually all
aids to construction. Contra, United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562
S1940), which held that statutes must be construed in light of all the inormation available. The Izaak Walton League v.Butz court did not draw
the circular distinction between statutes in derogation of the common law
(to be construed strictly) and remedial statutes (to be construed liberally).
This dichotomy is generally labeling used to create a make-weight argument at any rate. The court approached the question from the standpoint of
congressional intent in enacting this particular statute. See text infra p.
531-2.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970), see supra note 3.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) also contains some startling language to the effect that the timber harvested from the national forest may be used in the
state where it is cut but cannot be exported therefrom. This provision was
superseded in 1917 by provisions now codified in 16 U.S.C. § 491 (1970),
which placed exports in the realm of the Secretary of Agriculture's discretion. In 1926, 16 U.S.C. § 616 (1970) was enacted permitting such export
if in the Secretary's judgment local timber supplies are not depleted. Along
these same lines, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970) provides that among the purposes
authorizing the establishment of national forests is furnishing a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States. If we can make the assumption that national forest resources can
be utilized only in accordance with the purposes for which national forests
are established, then the clear and unmistakable conclusion is that timber
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parties stipulated this act to be the Secretary's only authoriization to sell,"8 it follows that only trees meeting these descriptions can be cut and sold. Similarly, congressional usage
of both the terms "mark" and "designate" in the sale provisions leads to the conclusion that "mark" refers to each
individual tree and "designate" refers to trees within an area.
Finally, the act provides that such timber shall be cut and
removed.
Clearly the learned judge had more on his mind than a
narrowly drawn, seventy-six-year-old statute. Some hint of
Judge Maxwell's thinking emerges from the severe construction he gave the purpose clauses of Sections 475 and 476."4
The conclusion reached by his construction is that commercial timbering for its own sake is completely unauthorized
in the national forest. The only reason any tree can be cut is
in furtherance of the growth of younger trees. Insight into
his nonstatutory considerations is also provided by the figures cited in documenting the extent of harvesting in the
Monongahela Forest and the proportion alleged to have been
clearcut.'5
Perhaps a more explicit expression of the implicit fears
of Judge Maxwell is to be found outside the record. Senator
Randolph of West Virginia suggested that perhaps the
Monongahela Forest had become a demonstration program
for intensive clearcutting which focused solely on the demand
for commercial timber.1" Judge Maxwell may well have
been concerned with the aesthetic and recreational values with
which clearcutting interferes. These points are well argued in

13.
14.

15.

16.

harvested from the national forests cannot be exported from this country.
This conclusion may make the protectionists happy, but no court has yet
reached this construction. Conceivably, a court could evade this result by
deciding 16 U.S.C. § 491 and § 616 (1970), discussed above, are sufficiently
broad to allow not only export from the state but export from the country
as well.
Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1017. See text infra p. 532.
Id. at 1020. 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) says the purpose of cutting the trees
shall be to further the growth of younger trees. The court utterly refused
to allow the purpose of providing timber specified in 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970)
to mitigate the limitations of the purpose set out in § 476.
Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1018. The figures indicated
that 39,922 acres were harvested between 1968 and 1972 with 14,300 acres
under contract to be cut at that time. Plaintiffs alleged that 46.7% of the
portion harvested during this period was clearcut. Ultimately, 784,000 out
of 820,000 acres were classified as commercial forest.
Senator Randolph, eupra note 7, at 14.
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the Sierra Club battlebook, CLEARCUT, THE

Vol. IX

DEFORESTATION

OF AMERICA," which, perhaps not so coincidentally, tells the

environmentalists' side of the story of the Monongahela
National Forest. In fact, public concern over the abuses of
this forest land lead to the creation of the first state government commission to investigate and recommend ways of controlling the alleged pillaging.'" Izaak Walton League v. Butz
thus seems to emerge as much a social reaction as a construction of statutory law. Before more fully considering the social
factors, several intervening legal barriers potentially affecting the case must be hurdled.
Initially, immediate legal action after the announcement of a timber sale by those seeking to stop it may be critical. In the principal case, the sales were announced in April
1973. and within a month plaintiffs had their temporary
restraining order."9 The plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Hardin0
were not so vigilant. That action was not initiated until five
years after announcement of the sale; the timbering company
was spending $100,000 a month in salaries in preparation for

the project and had committed itself to a $3,000,000 expenditure. This delay and reliance constituted laches which
pervaded the decision which tacitly permits clearcutting in
the face of some of the same arguments made in the principal
case. The Alaska court held that all plaintiffs' causes of
action except those arising from the National Environmental
Policy Act were barred by laches."
Another doctrine which arguably could alter the outcome
of Izaak Walton League v. Butz and similar cases is statutory
reenactment-a doctrine used extensively in tax law.22 Basically, this theory holds that if the Forest Service allows clearcutting and Congress subsequently passes any comprehensive
forest law without prohibiting it, Congress has implicitly
enacted a law permitting its usage. Reversal of the principal
17. WOOD, eupra note 8.
18. Craig, Esthetics, The Sixth Value, 76 AM. FORESTS 7 (Oct. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Craig).
19. Izaak Walton League v. Butz, eupra note 7, at 1019-1020.
20. 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
21. Id. at 127. The court also barred plaintiffs' causes of action on grounds
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See discussion infra note 47.
22. See Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Conn'r of Internal Revenue, 383 U.S. 272,
283 (1966), discuesed in J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 11 (1968).
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case, which is rumored to be on appeal, is unlikely on the
basis of this theory, however, because the statutory reenactment theory has merit only in the absence of congressional
action to the contrary. The restrictions in the Organic Act,"
as the court construed them, are a congressional mandate to
the contrary. Furthermore, the last extensive congressional
action in the forestry realm was in 1960,4 and clearcutting is
generally held to have become official Forest Service policy
in 1964.2"

A twin doctrine to reenactment is the doctrine of congressional acquiescence illustrated in United States v. Midwest Oil.26 In Midwest Oil, the Land Department successfully
argued that although it had no statutory authority to make
the type of reservation from entry at issue, it had been doing
so for a great many years. Congress knew of these actions,
so the court concluded that it had acquiesced in them. Again,
the outcome of Izaak 'Walton Lieague v. Butz would not be
changed, because the elapsed decade since clearcutting became official policy27 seems inadequate to provide sufficient
foundation for this assumption of executive power, especially
in light of the statutory provisions to the contrary. This is
not to say that no clearcutting was practiced prior to 1964.28
In fact, some commentators have been willing to assume clearcutting is so well established that any actions now contesting
it are delaying actions intended solely to obstruct the orderly
timbering of national forests.2 9 Apparently in answer to
this type of argument, the Izaak Walton League v. Butz court
stressed the fact that Congress has been careful to avoid any
abdication of its legislative control." ° In looking at congressional intent, the court found that at the time of the passage
of the Organic Act, Congress expressed a serious determina23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970), see supra note 3.
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1970).
Supra note 7, at 1018 n.4.
236 U.S. 459 (1915).
Supra note 7, at 1018 n.4.
28. See ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION ORGANIZATION, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING,
ECOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CLEARcUTTING IN

THE MEDICINE

Bow

SOME
NATIONAL

(1972) which indicates clearcutting in the Medicine
Bow National Forest began in 1952.
29. Rogers, Izaiahs at the Bar: Environmentalists and the Judicial Process,
7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 63, 68-70 (1972).
30. Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1022.
FOREST WYOMING 3
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tion to stop the exploitive invasion of these public lands." In
other words, Congress made its mandate clear, even if it was
seventy-six years prior to this case. The court held that if the
science of silviculture and the peoples' will have now changed,
it is only within the competence of Congress to change the
law. 2
A much stronger argument against the holding in Izaak
Walton League v. Butz than reenactment and acquiescence is
that the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act" grants additional
authority for the sale of timber. This act provides that the
purposes it enumerates are supplemental to, and not in derogation of, the purposes set out in 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970). 4
However, it is Section 476 which contains the substantive
restrictions, and it is clear that authority for contravening
the limitations of Section 476 is not inherently in conflict
with the purposes set out in Section 475." Thus harvesting
timber is authorized by 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1970)"6 and such
lumbering is not necessarily restricted by the mature growth,
mark and designate, and cut and remove provisions of the
Organic Act.
This discussion parallels, but is distinguishable from, the
theory of implied repeal discussed decently in Friends of the
Earth v. Armtrong.7 Armstrong involved Section 3 of the
Colorado River Storage Act"8 which provides that no dam or
reservoir built under the authority of that act be within any
national park or monument. Section 1 of that act provides
specifically that protective measures must be taken to ensure
no harm comes to the Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1023.
16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1970).
16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
The tension between Section 475 and Section 476 was discussed previously
in the context of the purpose clauses. Section 475 contains the broad congressional reason for creating national forests. Proper clearcutting is not
in violation of the purposes for which the forests were created even though
clearcutting is, as the Izaak Walton League v. Butz court held, in violation of the specific limitations of Section 476. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970) alludes
specifically to 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970) and not the Organic Act in general
which would include Section 476.
36. "The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to develop and
administer the renewable resources of the national forests for multiple
use and sustained yield of the several products and services obtained
therefrom."
37. 5 E.R.C. 1694 (10th Cir. 1973).
38. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (1970).
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The court found that these two provisions were inserted in
the context of the preparation for the Glen Canyon Dam
which at full capacity backs the waters of Lake Powell into
the Rainbow Bridge National Monument unless protective
measures are taken. Upon a fuller consideration of the costs,
Congress subsequently declined to appropriate sufficient
funds, and in fact prohibited the utilization of any funds, to
build the protective facilities." The district court enforced
the provisions of Section 1 and enjoined the appropriate
authorities from allowing the water to back up into the monument. The appellate court reversed and held that the failure
to appropriate or allow the use of funds amounted to a clear,
direct, and informed repeal of the previous policy even
though that policy remained in the statutes."0 Armstrong
differentiated Posadas v. National City Bank," ' which ruled
generally that implied repeals in all areas will not be found
unless there are clear statutory indications Congress meant
to do so, by finding congressional intent to be clear.
No such intention to repeal can be found in the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act. As mentioned, 16 U.S.C. § 528
makes the purposes of this act supplemental to the Organic
Act. The Izaak Walton League v. Butz court was therefore
correct in finding there was no repeal by implication." However, the court failed to comprehend that the Organic Act
need not be repealed before clearcutting can be authorized
because the restrictions of Section 476 apply only to the cutting authorized therein and Section 529 now authorizes adlitional cutting. The administrative agencies seem to recognize the Multple Use-Sustained Yield Act authorizes timber sales. In fact some regulatory provision authorizations
of timber sales are based upon this act. 3 Either the defendants failed to make this argument, as would appear from
their stipulation that the Organic Act is the only authority
for sales," or the court did not respond to it.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, supra note 37, at 1698.
Id. at 1699.
296 U.S. 497 (1936).
Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1021.
36 C.F.R. § 221.6 (1973).
Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1017.
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THE PRECEDENTS

Examination of other cases construing 16 U.S. §§ 473482 reveals cases ranging in subject matter from peat moss
to taxes. Only Sierra Club v. Hardin" and Thompson v.
United States 6 are sufficiently related to Izaak Walton
League v. Butz to warrant full consideration.47
The only other federal case to reach the substantive restrictions of 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) is Sierra Club v. Hardin.4' Before reaching the substantive arguments the Alaska
district court considered several collaterally relevant factors
beyond the scope of this note.4" The chief nexus between the
two cases is the common allegation of failure to mark and
designate each tree. In the Alaska case, the defendants
countered this allegation by arguing that the trees must be
marked before they are sold but since title does not pass in
any given tree until it is cut and paid for, the restriction is
not violated. Thus a marking at the sawmill is sufficient in
their view to fulfill the technical requirements of the statute.
The court thought both extremes inconsistent with the multi45. Supra note 20.
46. 308 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1962).
47. An example of the specific following of 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) right down
to the necessity of the trees being dead is Lewis v. Garlock, 168 F. 153
(D.S.D. 1909). The dispute arose when holders of mining claims objected to
the government selling beetle-infested trees which they apparently were
using in their claims. The case is not directly related to Izaak Walton
League v. Butz because the primary issue was who owned the trees rather
than under what restrictions they could be cut.
48. Supra note 20.
49. Chiefly they are standing, the appropriatness of judicial review of administrative action, and exhaustion of administration remedies. None of
these issues were contested in the principal case. The court concluded its
standing discussion by finding the conservation organizations to have
standing to assert aesthetic, conservation, and recreation interests of local
members who are directly affected by the timber sales, at least under statutes which clearly evince congressional intent to protect such uses. Where
congressional intent is solely to protect the citizen as a taxpayer, the
Alaska court found standing more questionable. Thus, if the bidding requirement of 16 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) is simply for the purpose of insuring
adequate compensation for the trees, aesthetic injury would not give the
taxpayer standing to contest failures in this process. This conclusion is
not inconsistent with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), decided
subsequently, in which the Supreme Court denied standing to those who
did not allege personal use. The Alaska court proceeded to find the Secretary's duties under the act to be mandatory and therefore judicial review
is not barred by 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (1970), the Administrative Procedures
Act section in question. The court then reached the issue of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It pointed out that the Sierra Club was fully
aware of the protest procedures within the Forest Service and the failure
to utilize them constituted a bar to all causes of action save the one arising
under the newly-enacted National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4347 (1970).
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ple use embodied in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of
1960.0 It found individual marking prior to cutting constituted too onerous a burden. The court pointed out that blocks
of timber are designated every five years and provisions are
made for withdrawing areas particularly valuable for recreation and aesthetic purposes. The court's decision amounts
to extrapolating the broad purpose from all the relevant
statutes and applying it to the facts before it. Judge Plummer accepted neither plaintiffs' nor defendants' construction but rather was ultimately oblivious to the specific statutory restrictions.' No allegations were made concerning
the limitation of cutting to dead, mature or large growth trees
or the requirement of total removal. Even if they had been
made, the broad perspective approach used by Judge Plummer might well have overridden the narrow language of the
statute.2
Another case suggesting possible complications in analyzing the reach of the Organic Act in clearcutting and other
topic areas is Thompson v. United States."3 The dispute in
Thompson bottomed on the question of whether Thompson
could obtain mineral rights in the national forest pursuant
to 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1970), which is part of the Organic Act.
The land in question was deeded to the United States and accepted by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the ClarkeMcNary Act.5" The forest land in Izaak Walton League v.
Butz, on the other hand, was apparently acquired pursuant
to the Appalachian Forest Act. 5 Both acts provide that all
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-541 (1970).
51. Sierra Club v. Hardin, supra note 20, at 121-123.
52. A bit of historical irony is added to Sierra Club v. Hardin, id., by Tee-HitTon Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), in which the United
States Supreme Court denied compensation to Indians for divesting their
claims in the North Tongass National Forest where a decade later the
sale in Sierra Club v. Hardintook place. Add to this the long term contract
to sell the total output of the forest harvesting operation contested in
Sierra Club v. Hardin, Id. at 105, and the result is the United States government taking timber lands from the Indians without compensation so
that the Japanese can have wood, all in the name of protecting the forest,
improving water conditions, and furnishing a continuous supply of timber
to United States citizens per 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970).
53. Supra note 46.
54. Specifically, 16 U.S.C. § 569 (1970). This act and the Appalachian Forest
Act, discussed note 55 infra, are the basic forest purchase acts.
55. Also termed the Weeks Act of March 1, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-186, § 7, 36
STAT. 963, which has been substantially amended and codified in 16 U.S.C.
§ 516 (1970).
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land acquired under their authority shall be administered
in accordance with the provisions of Section 11"6 of the Appalachian Forest Act. Finally, Section 11 provides that such
land shall be administered in accordance with the provisions
of the National Forest Creative Act of 1891." Thompson's
problem arose because the Organic Act is limited by its terms
to public lands,"5 and neither the Clarke-McNary Act nor
the Appalachian Forest Act are sufficiently broad to make
land acquired under their authority subject to the Organic
Act. Ultimately the Thompson court held that Thompson
owed the United States $73,201.63 for minerals converted
plus $42,670.22 forth of minerals not yet sold, on the theory
that he intentionally trespassed on lands not subject to
mineral entry and profited to that extent.59
An amendment to the Appalachian Forest Act in 1925"0
further complicates the application of this public landacquired land dichotomy to Izaak Walton League v. Butz.
It provides, in substance, that timber acquired in accordance
with its provisions shall be cut and removed under the laws
and regulations relating to such national forests under the
direction and supervision of the Secretary of Agriculture.
The amendment retains the reference to Section 11 of the
Appalachian Forest Act which makes the land subject to
the Creative Act as discussed above. The crucial problem
presented is whether the phrase "laws and regulations relating to such national forests" can be taken to make the national
forest land acquired under the Appalachian Forest Act subject to all forest laws notwithstanding the Organic Act's limitation to public lands. Reading that amendment to absolve
the limitations of the Organic Act does not seem justified,
particularly in light of the fact that the amendment did not
56. Now substantially codified in 16 U.S.C. § 521 (1970).
57. Act of March 3 1891, Pub. L. No. 55-561, 26 STAT. 1103 now codified as
amended in 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1970).
58. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1970). The distinction between acquired land and public
land was defined in Barash v. Seaton, 256 F.2d 714, 715 (1958), in terms
of whether the land was within the original public domain or acquired from
private or state ownership.
59. Thompson v. United States, supra note 46, at 630-631.
60. Act of March 3, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-473, 43 STAT. 1215. Note that this
language contains the same "cut and remove" terminology found in 16
U.S.C. § 476 (1970), upon which the plaintiffs based one of their contentions in the principal case. As to that contention it makes no difference
whether the restriction is in the Organic Act or the amended Appalachian
Forest Act.
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specifically mention the Organic Act is it did the Creative
Act.
The conclusion reached by this neecssarily complex analysis is that the Organic Act does not apply to acquired lands.
This determination, based on the reasoning of Thompson v.
United States,8 indicates that Izaak Walton League v. Butz
was decided incorrectly. The Monongahela National Forest,
being land over which the United States did not originally
have dominion, is by definition acquired land." If, as the
parties stipulated, the Organic Act is the Secretary's only
authority for making sales, and the Organic Act is inapplicable to acquired land, the Secretary lacks any statutory authority to make sales in the Monongahela and other acquired
forests. Again, not all sales are banned if the Multiple UseSustained Yield Act gives this authority as previously discussed. Whether or not the distinction between acquired land
and public land can be justified from a policy standpoint is
open to question.63 As
Thompson indicates, the distinction
64
does exist in the law.

PoMcy

In a sense, Izaak Walton League v. Butz settles nothing.
It is subject to reversal by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court, and ultimately by
the Congress. Even without reversal its clearcutting proscription stands only in West Virginia. The case, in perspective, is but one of the judicial battles in the war over clearcutting now raging between the competing users of the national forests.
Congress specifically recognized most of the competing
interests in the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act.65 That act
61. Supra note 46.
62. The status of the Monongahela is discussed more fully in Curtis, "For the
Snark was a Boojum, You See": Counseling with Caution in Administering
Acquired Eastern National Forest Lands Since NEPA, 9 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 21, 46 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Curtis).
63. Compare Curtis, supra note 62, at 36, with PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEW
COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PuBLIc LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION

5 (1970).
64. For a much broader discussion of the acquired forest land realm, see Curtis,
supra note 62.
65. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
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specifies that the forests are to be administered for outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes. What the act does not specify is the relative importance to be accorded each use. The West Virginia Commission argues that each use should be given equal weight."6
Judge Plummer concluded that since Congress did not specify
any weight, the choice is left to the discretion of those who
are administering the forest. 7 His conclusion seems inescapable form a legal standpoint. The clearcutting dispute is
primarily a conflict between those who would use the forest
for timber and those who would use the forest for recreation.
The first logical policy question is why anyone would
want to clearcut in the first place. The most commonly
voiced, lumber-related justifications are increased efficiency, 8 with its concomitant lower harvesting costs," and the
regeneration of those species of trees needing sunlight when
they are young.7" The greater efficiency comes in two phases.
Initially, clearcutting allows the use of larger machines 7' and
results in a higher yield of lumber from each acre harvested.72
Perhaps even more important are the commercial advantages
from the second crop of trees which are uniform in size.73
Estimates of the decrease in efficiency in harvesting Douglas
fir if clearcutting were unavailable run as high as thirtyeight percent." Closely allied with this output theme is the
increased regeneration of light sensitive species, including
not only Douglas fir but many of the eastern hardwoods.
The theory is that for those species requiring sunlight, clearcutting is the only feasible silviculture method giving any
kind of satisfactory regeneration.7 " Along these same lines,
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

The commission would also add a sixth value, aesthetics, Craig, eupra note
18.
Sierra Club v. Hardin, supra note 20, at 123.
Davis, ABC's of Even-Aged Management, 77 AM. FORESTS 19, 49 (Aug.
1971).
McQuilkin, To Regenerate Eastern Hardwoods-Clearcut,76 AM. FORESTS
20 (1970) (hereinafter cited as McQuilkin).
Hearings on Management Practices on the Public Lands Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 243 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Hearings).
McQuilkin, supra note 69, at 48.
See Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1018.
McQuilkin, supra note 69, at 85.
Id. at 22. But cf. Hearings,supra note 70, at 56.
McQuilkin, supra note 69, at 20.
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it is argued that clearcutting allows the introduction of higher
value"' species of trees."'
The immediate reply from the recreational faction is that
such arguments focus on timber productivity to the exclusion
of all other values. No doubt the timber companies derive
substantial profit from timber production, but their profits
are not alone on the timber production side of the scale. The
wood product consumer's interest must be considered also.
In considering his interest, we start with the proposition
that an industry-wide increase in efficiency in an industry
with any competition will lead to a reduction in the price of
the product.78 To this must be added the potential substitution of competing products." A forty percent decrease in the
cost of wood thus will not necessarily decrease the cost of
goods now made of wood the same forty percent. The conclusion reached is that clearcutting results in some relative savings, but how much is a function of the amount of increased
efficiency which results, industry competition, and the availability of substitute products.
One further observation is necessary on the timber factor.
The national forests do not constitute a monopoly of all land
which can be utilized for timber production."0 Not only are
there sizeable private forest stands now, but lands not currently in timber production are capable of growing commercial timber. In a purely economic sense, if clearcutting is
sufficiently profitable it will eventually attract more private
lands. The clearcutting of private lands is apt to raise less
of a public outcry."
76. Higher value, not in the sense of wildlife, recreation, or aesthetics, but
most desirable for commercial harvesting. See Senator Randolph, tupra
note 7, at 14.
77. McQuilkin, eupra note 69, at 85.
78.

See L. REYNOLDS, ECONOMICS, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 378-79 (3rd. ed.

1969).
79. Id. at 61. The same concept is discussed in terms of cross elasticity of
demand in D. WATSON, PRIcE THEORY AND ITS USES 109-10 (2nd ed. 1968).
80. Only 23 percent of the total timber production in 1965 came from the
national forests, according to the STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES 624 (1973). The same source indicates that in 1950 only 7 percent
of the total timber output came from the national forest. The discussion
in the text ignores the inevitable time lag involved in the growth of trees.
81. Cf. Comment, Trees, Earth, Water and Ecological Upheaval: Logging
Practices and Watershed Protection in California, 54 CA&i.L. REV. 1117
(1966) (hereinafter cited as Logging Practices).
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Just as all potential timber land is not in the national
forest, not all recreation land is within the national forest
system. Even if the forests were completely obliterated,
some of the dollars now spent and some of the fun now enjoyed in utilizing the forests for recreation will be spent and
found in other forms of recreation."2 Another factor mitigating injury to recreational values should clearcutting be permitted in the general forest is the classification of land for
uses in which all commercial timbering is forbidden. The
prime example is the wilderness system which is closed to
lumbering as well as all motor vehices whether commercial
or recreational. Even within the nonwilderness forest some
portion may be set aside for recreational purposes."4 In the
Monongahela Forest at the time of the clearcutting decision,
some 36,000 acres, roughly four and one-half percent of the
total area, was classified as noncommercial forest."5
Many of the conflicts between the competing sides can be
eliminated by terminating the incidents of improper clearcutting. The West Virginia Commission advocates limitation
of clearcut size to 25 acres.88 Industry presentations have
indicated that modern clearcuts are limited to 50 acres.87
The beginnings of a consensus that clearcuts should not exceed 50 acres is apparent. Another prime concern of the
conservation-oriented people seems to be the degradation of
streams caused by clearcutting either on grades too steep or
too close to the streams' banks.8 " There still should be enough
timber standing in the forests that correction of these poor
clearcutting techniques should impose no hardship on the
lumbering faction. 8
82. One member of the West Virginia Commission argues that clearcutting
should be eliminated because tourism produces ten times the income of
timbering in West Virginia (quoted by Brooks, Senate Hears Clearcutting
Concerns, 69 J. OF FORESTRY 301 (1971)). This reasoning not only ignores
the substitution factor, but it blindly assumes every tourist dollar spent in
the state at that time was spent in the pursuit of forest recreation.
83. Pursuant to the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1970).
84. 36 C.F.R. § 221.3(4) (1973).
85. Izaak Walton League v. Butz, supra note 7, at 1018.
86. Craig, supra note 18, at 7.
87. McQuilkin, supra note 69, at 50.
88. See Logging Practices, supra note 81.
89. The factors mentioned are of course only some of the considerations. The
proposed RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 850B

(Tent. Draft No. 17,

1971) more fully enumerates some of the factors any decision-maker,
whether administrative, judicial, or legislative, must consider. The factors,
as adjusted for our context, include the purpose of the respective uses, the
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the district court decision in Izaak
Walton League v. Butz seems more of a judicial reaction to
abuses in a given factual situation than a definite indication
of how the clearcutting issue will be ultimately resolved. The
parties assumed that the Organic Act is the Forest Service's
sole statutory authority for allowing any timber to be harvested. In fact, such authority appears to be derivable from
the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act as well. If the Organic
Act were the only authorization to sell, the reasoning of the
Thompson case indicates the Secretary probably has no authorization to sell at all because the Organic Act is inapplicable to acquired land.
The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act defines the
multiple use it mandates in terms of the greatest benefit to
the American people, which is not necessarily the greatest
dollar return." Maximization of the public good becomes the
ultimate goal. The almost complete inability to quantify the
factors and accord them appropriate weight is manifest. The
Secretary's determination of the values would be given much
credence in any dispute." In short, forcing an administrative agency to do anything, or not do anything, on a statute as
nebulous as the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act seems remote. If the discomfort with the decisions of the Secretary,
and those who report to him, becomes sufficiently intolerable,
the ultimate resolution of the dispute will he with Congress.
K. CRAIG WILLIAMS

suitability of the uses to this forest, the economic value of the uses, the
social value of the uses, the extent and amount of harm caused, the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the use of one user or the
other, the practicality of adjusting the portion of forest used by the
respective users, the protection of existing values of land, investments, and
industries (both timber and recreational) and the burden of requiring the
user causing the harm to bear the loss. These are all tough questions, many
of which will be answered by Environmental Impact Statements which may
eventually be required for each timber sale from the indications of Wyoming
Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). For
a wealth of background material on the cleareutting dispute, see Hearings,
supra note 70, and parts 2 and 3.
90. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1970).
91. Sierra Club v. Hardin, supra note 20, at 119. See also Udall v. Talman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965).
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